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Introduction
The interconnectedness of global trade influences international relations. The complexities of this
interconnectedness may be better understood through quantitative analysis of the balance of trade within
the global economic system. Economics is an instrument of national power affecting international
relations. Transnational trade relationships offer both risk and opportunity in the pursuit of national
objectives. Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of national economies around the world.
This interconnectedness potentially enables international coalition building based upon common
economic interest. Likewise, such interconnectedness potentially deters, moderates, and constrains
nations from actions, which would negatively affect their economy. Analysis of such relationships
presents decision makers both risk and opportunities in terms of international support, influence and the
potential success of economic coercion.
This paper serves as a proof-of-concept testing analytic tools for better understanding the efficacy and
consequences of economic influence in terms of sanctions and other similar macroeconomic regimes.
The underlying concept developed is a calculation of economic threat rings describing the propensity and
utility of countries to participate in such regimes. Economic threat rings are bounded by the distance
across each of the dimensions of international trade between the country imposing sanctions and the
targeted country. For any given set of countries, the economies of countries inside the ring are more at
risk to sanctions than those outside the ring. Any countries inside the ring are, therefore, rationally less
likely to support such sanctions. The existence of national economies inside such rings shows that
sanctions are an imprecise weapon. Sanctions necessarily require countries other than the targeted
country to accept losses in the global economy in order for sanctions to be effective. When such loses
are suffered by countries un-desirous of supporting sanctions for political, economic or other reasons
then the prospect for influencing the targeted country is reduced.
In this paper the economic threat ring technique is applied to the case of modern day Iran. Iran is used as
a case study as it has a long standing record of sanctions being imposed upon it by the United States and
others since its 1979 revolution. Iran continues to be of contemporary interest in American foreign policy
owing to concerns with respect to its known sponsorship of terrorism and suspected pursuit of nuclear
weapons. Based on analysis of the results, conclusions are drawn with respect to the risk opportunities
present to American decision makers in terms of international support and the potential success of
economic coercion targeted against Iran. Statistical analysis of publicly available balance of trade data
for Iran and its interconnected network of related global trading partners are central to this study.
Defining and Classifying the Problem
The history of both unilateral and multilateral sanctions is one wrought with very limited success in
modifying the behavior of targeted countries. Countries such as Cuba, Sudan, Libya, North Korea, Iraq
and Iran have faced sanctions for decades.[1] In Cuba, the Castro government has maintained power
and sustained its repressive regime off the coast of the United States even after the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1989. Sudan has continued to this day to be a safe-haven for terrorism and criminals while
engaging in government sponsored genocide in Darfur. Libya has exhibited some behavioral change
relative to its sponsorship of global terrorism; however, not until  after air strikes by American forces. North
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Korea developed nuclear weapons under sanctions. In retrospect, we now know that Iraq may have
essentially complied with sanctions following the Gulf War; however, their behavior and rhetoric still led to
violent conflict in the form of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iran continues to be a sponsor of terrorism,
particularly Hezballah, and is suspected to be developing nuclear weapons in its nuclear energy program.
Iran has continuously obstructed oversight of its nuclear program by international organizations such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This brief history of sanctions shows that the prospect for successful sanctions is grim; however, these
examples do not answer the question of why sanctions are generally ineffective. Most importantly it is
necessary to understand the complexity of the global economic system. By understanding the complexity
of this system, it is then possible to select analytical techniques which are best suited to its examination.
Having identified such techniques it is then possible to evaluate relationships in the global economic
system and quantify the economic risk to countries considering participation in sanctions upon any other
country.
It should also be noted that sanctions are generally not applied to all commodities in the global economic
system. Frequently, medical and food aid and trade are excluded from sanctions for humanitarian
reasons.[2] Such exclusions will be detailed later in this paper utilizing the Iran case study. In general,
however, this means that the degree to which sanctions affect a sanctioning country as well as the
sanctioned country depends on the type of commodities which are involved in their respective trade
arrangements. The commodity based perspective of sanctions adds to the complexity of global economic
trade.
While it is commonly accepted that global trade is a complex system, there is utility in formally defining
the nature of its complexity. There are many models available to describe complex problems. We apply
the model defined by Axelrod in his book Harnessing Complexity. The reason Axelrod’s model was
selected is that his goal is not simply to describe complexity, but rather go further into understanding
opportunities to take advantage of complexity. In the context of this research, Axelrod’s model helps to
clearly articulate the class of problem presented by economic coercion on a transnational scale which
then enables the selection of appropriate methods to examine such problems.
Axelrod defines a complex system using the following model.[3] Complex systems, such as global trade,
involve a large number of agents (or countries in this study). Agents form a population; in this study the
population shall be the countries found relevant to understanding Iranian trade relations relative to
international economic coercion. Material resources used by agents are known as artifacts which are
trade goods in this study. And, patterned behavior by agents is known as a strategy, or patterns of trade
in this study, which are based on bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as market forces. All of
these elements form a system, in this case the global economic system.
This system, using Axelrod’s model, is particularly complex owing to the number and diversity of
interactions between agents. It is bounded by geography (or what Axelrod calls physical space) as well as
trading blocs, agreements and other non-physical influences (which Axelrod calls conceptual space).
Economic coercion relates directly to modifying what Axelrod calls selection, related to the frequency with
which agents implement certain strategies relative to other agents or types of agents. Strategies, for
example, may include most favored nation trade status (reward) as well as sanctions, boycotts and
blockades (coercion). And, finally, Axelrod argues that agents employ success criterion. While success
criterion related to global trade generally may include increased trade revenue, Foreign Direct
Investment, growth in Gross Domestic Product and so on; in this study, the criteria shall be the degree to
which the ends of economic coercion strategies are realized. So, for example, if the reason sanctions are
applied economically is human rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and/or other such
issues; then success should be measured in terms of positive change on these issues from the
perspective of the country(s) engaging in economic coercion.
Formally defining international trade as a complex system and economic coercion as a bridge between
international relations and economic strategies of countries adds context to this problem. More
importantly, it describes the class of problem studied in this paper and as a direct consequence the class
of solution techniques which are applicable to the analysis of this problem. Multi-Dimensional Scaling
(MDS), described in the methodology section, is a solution technique well suited to complex problems
where the underlying patterns of behavior are both complex and ambiguous.
Methodology
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Economic threat rings will be calculated using non-metric Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) because it is
a technique which yields a graphic representation of the proportional closeness and relative orientation of
objects (countries in this study) based on data where understanding the underlying dimensionality is
complex and ambiguous (global trade and its relationship to international relations in this study). MDS
“provides a visual representation of the pattern of proximities (i.e., similarities or distances) among a set
of objects.”[4] If N is the number of countries studied, MDS requires an NxN matrix, A, with elements aij
representing trade between countries i and j in N.[5] This matrix is called the similarity matrix.[6]
MDS also requires a stress function that measures “the degree of correspondence between distances [or
similarities].”[7] The Kruskal stress function is commonly used in MDS and defined as: ((∑i∑j  aij - dij)/(
∑i∑j dij
2))1/2 where dij is the Euclidean distance between points i and j based on the coordinates
assigned.[8]
Using a MDS algorithm, it is possible to graphically plot the coordinates of nations in the global economy
for every two dimensional projection of distance. Each dimension corresponds to a mathematically
unique aspect of the data under investigation. Those nations that are closer to each other are, based on
the theory of this technique, closer economically in the context of the measure applied.
MDS does not and cannot explain or label what these aspects are in a non-mathematical context.
Therefore, relationships found of interest in MDS results must be explored through additional research in
terms of the context (international trade in this study) to determine the practical nature of the relationship.
To analyze U.S. sanctions on Iran, economic threat rings are drawn with Iran at the center and the radius
defined by the distance between Iran and the United States for each dimension of the trade relationship
found statistically significant in the MDS analysis. The radius of this ring represents the degree to which
the United States is connected to Iran’s economy both directly and indirectly. Countries inside the ring
have greater economic connectedness than the United States for a given dimension making them
simultaneously more capable and less likely to participate in coercive economic actions owing to the
potential impact on their own economy. Countries outside of the ring have less economic connectedness
than the United States making them simultaneously less capable and more likely to participate in coercive
economic actions. Likewise, leaders of countries inside the ring are accepting greater political risk than
those outside of the ring relative to the risk American leaders are accepting.
Risk in this context has two main components which are interconnected. First, there is economic risk.
Economic risk is the quantifiable potential for losses to the economy of countries imposing sanctions. This
includes losses as a direct result of imports and exports to or from the sanctioned country as well as
losses from lessened supply and demand in other countries commonly trading with sanctioned country.
Second, and closely tied to economic risk, is political risk. Leaders who make decisions, perhaps for
ideological motivations or reasons related to foreign relations, who cause damage to the economic health
of their own country risk their ability to maintain power. Depending on the political systems and traditions
of such countries, they risk anything from losing reelection to civil unrest and insurrection.
The paradox between capability and likelihood shall be examined in terms of opportunities and risk. The
results of this examination are then qualitatively compared to positions, strategies, and actions taken by
statistically significant countries with respect to Iran. The correlation between the analysis of statistical
results and respective national policies and behaviors shall serve as evidence either confirming or
denying the hypothesis that trade relationships constrain international relations within the scope of this
study.
It should be noted that there is an inherent potential bias in this analysis of balance of trade data as for
any given year the effects of such sanctions both explicit and implicit may be causal in the relations
described by such economic threat rings. Explicitly, as will be discussed later, many countries choose
largely not to participate in US sanctions on Iran making them nearly unilateral in nature. This adds some
degree of confidence to the selection of Iran as a case study; however, the implicit resulting hostility
towards Iran by countries friendly to the United States is more difficult to estimate. As data regarding such
implicit influence on decision making is difficult if not impossible to collect, this effect shall be treated as a
source of potential error rather than as an explicit factor in quantitative analysis.
Data selected for use is the percentage of a country’s imports and exports to or from another country
bilaterally. Percentages are used as the monetary value of trade varies drastically depending on the
countries examined; however, percentages are understood to represent the relative significance of the
bilateral trade relationship to a country’s economy. Separate datasets were developed for imports and
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exports, respectively.
In examining data available from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook, United Nations
(UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organization (WTO); the
CIA’s data was found to be best structured for this purpose.[9],[10],[11],[12],[13],[14] In all of these
databases, the most current, complete dataset was for the calendar year 2007.
First, Iran’s most significant trading partners were included. Iran’s major export partners are China,
Japan, Turkey, South Korea, and Italy.[15] Iran’s major import partners are China, Germany, United Arab
Emirates, South Korea, Russia, and Italy.[16] Second, the major trading partners of these countries were
included. These secondary relationships are included to capture potential triangular trade relationships
where goods are transshipped via an intermediate country. Such triangular trade is both a common
practice in international trade as well as a means of avoiding trade barriers, sanctions and other coercive
economic measures.
Third, conscious effort was made to include the five permanent members (P-5) of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), the Group of 8 (G8), and members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). The P-5 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) were included
as the P-5 are the key decision makers in the application of international sanctions and other similar
coercive measures. The G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and
United States) was included as this organization represents leading global economies. Note that the G8
includes the Group of 7 (G7) with the addition of Russia. Members and observers of the SCO (China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan) were
included as the SCO represents opportunity for Iran to avoid Western coercion by looking Eastward and
because Iran presently has observer status in this economic and security cooperation organization.[17] In
cases where countries are members of more than one of these categories or organizations, that country
is only represented once in the respective dataset. Fourth, any remaining major trading partners of any of
the countries included thus far and cited in the CIA data were included for completeness.
Larger organizations such as the European Union (EU), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), WTO, UN, and so on were not explicitly included as the resultant dataset would be extravagantly
large and not necessarily strongly tied to the economic coercion of Iran. Relevant countries included in
the data used here, however, are members of some or all of these larger organizations. Therefore, the
role of these larger organizations as applied to the case of Iran, while not explicitly included in the data, is
included implicitly in the data and shall be discussed in terms of analysis and conclusions with respect to
this data.
This selection process resulted in a total of 35 countries in the imports dataset and 37 countries in the
exports dataset. Datasets, including lists of countries and their respective trade data, are provided in the
Appendix. Countries are listed by their two letter country code defined by the International Organization
for Standardization.[18] Note that totals of the percentages in the datasets need not necessarily sum to
100% owing to the selection process described above. While the datasets are somewhat sparse, they are
a non-random sample representing a population bounded only by the selection process defined above.
Both datasets are of sufficient size to conduct statistical analysis with respect to this case study of Iran.
As previously noted, these datasets do not contain factors indicating past or present participation, explicit
or implicit, in economic coercion of Iran. Future studies expanding this methodology beyond a proof-of-
concept should consider time series analysis of available data spanning the period prior to the application
of sanctions to the present. For this case study, such effects are treated as a potential source of error
analytically and shall be addressed in the contextual analysis of results with respect to the policy position
of countries and organizations found significant in the following analysis. Such analysis is not needed to
test whether economic threat rings as defined in this study have a correlation to related international
policy towards Iran. Such further analysis would only be required for detailed analysis of the efficacy of
such policies over time which is beyond the scope of this research. 
Analysis
Using the import and export data described above it is possible to apply non-metric MDS to these
samples. As noted in the methodology discussion, it is necessary to select bounds on stress when using
MDS. The goal selected for this study is to reduce the stress to at or below 0.10 (or 10 percent). This
level of stress represents 10 percent or less distortion of the underlying data. Stress is reduced by
increasing the dimensionality, p, in the MDS algorithm. As the input and export data is already single
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dimensional, the options for p start at 2 and would never be greater than the total number of countries, N,
in the dataset.
Stress levels as dimensionality increases for the import and export datasets are provided below. Stress
was calculated by entering the matrix datasets for imports and exports into the software package UCINET
and running the non-metric MDS algorithm while sequentially increasing the dimensionality from 2 to 10
dimensions.[19]
From this data, it can be observed that the exports dataset preformed slightly better than the imports
dataset in terms of stress. This is most likely owing to the fact that the exports dataset is slightly larger
than the imports dataset and, thus, has more information regarding the underlying system. To confirm
empirically that the underlying data is non-metric, metric MDS was run on both datasets. Even at 10
dimensions, the stress for the exports dataset was 0.131 and the stress for the imports dataset was
0.133. Both of these stress levels are above the threshold selected for this study of 0.10 and high
dimensionally with high stress is an indicator of non-metric underlying data (i.e., significant lack of fit to a
metric space as previously defined).
To conduct further analysis, it is necessary to determine which dimensional representation to use. Stress
is reduced mathematically as the dimensionality increases. This may represent properties of the data,
may be artificial, or a combination of both. Therefore, a theoretical rather than mathematical reason
should be the basis for this decision. For example, if the data we were studying were known to be the
physical volume of rectangular buildings, then we would know that the expected dimensionality is three
(representing some projection of length, width and height).
In this problem we do not know with certainty the underlying dimensionality. We chose to use the three
dimensional representation for a number of reasons. First, triangular trade, as already described, is
common and such trade would have at least three dimensions. Second, the stress for both imports and
exports in three dimensions is well below 0.10 indicating very little distortion. Third, the same
dimensionality should be used for both imports and exports as one country’s exports are another
country’s imports and vice versa. Fourth, this selection is conservative in terms of mitigating any
mathematical artificiality in the results caused by over specifying the dimensionality. Fifth, while it will
require three two-dimensional graphs per dataset, it is possible to visually assess the resulting graphical
representations of the three dimensional solutions, which is consistent with the methodology used in this




Now that the three dimensional solution has been identified as the most appropriate for use in this study,
it is necessary to produce the mappings of the imports and exports by country and overlay the economic
threat rings as previously defined extending from Iran to the United States in each of the two dimensional
projections of the data.
The following three graphs represent the imports dataset where proximity of one country to another in
each dimension is related to similarities in its import trade relationships with other countries. Note that
these similarities result from the complex interactions of bilateral trade relationships as a percentage of
the volume of trade related to the countries total trade. This nuance allows for a much more robust
analysis of economic influence than merely examining the first order bilateral relationships between
countries and their closest trading partners.
The axes are unitless in these graphs as the distance has no absolute scale and relative closeness of
one country to another should only be interpreted in a context relative to the closeness of other countries
in the graph. The orientation of the graph has no significance and any rotation of the graph is equally
valuable as it is a conceptual representation of the data rather than a physical representation. As
discussed previously, economic threat rings were overlaid on top of the MDS graphs by centering a circle
on Iran (IR) with a radius equal to the distance from Iran to the U.S.
 
In the two dimensional projection in Figure 1, it can be observed that the majority of the countries in the
data have closer ties to Iran (IR) than the United States (US). Additionally, Iran appears to be relatively
isolated from most countries and particularly western powers. The closest countries to Iran are Pakistan
(PK), Belarus (BY), and United Arab Emirates (AE). Iran imports 9.1% of its total imports from the United
Arab Emirates; however, has no significant imports from Pakistan or Belarus in the underlying data.[20]
Pakistan’s closeness can be explained as it exports 10.4 percent of its total exports to the United Arab
Emirates.[21] The relationship to Belarus is even more complex to understand and can be explained by
its close trading ties with both Germany and Russia, as Germany accounts for 9.6 percent and Russia for
5.7 percent of Iran’s total imports.[22] Germany (DE), Russia (RU) and Italy (IT), who all account for
significant percentages of Iran’s total imports, are next in terms of closeness along with Saudi Arabia
(SA). The position of Saudi Arabia can be explained by its strong relationship with the United Arab
Emirates.
Conducting this type of analysis for every two dimensional projection of both datasets will allow for the
identification of the key actors in terms of economic influence on Iran. As expected and based on the
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theoretical foundation of this methodology, it is possible to visualize the relative significance of triangular
and other complex trade patterns between countries. This more robust understanding of economic
interest provides a clearer picture of economies at risk in terms of coercing Iran.
To complete our examination of the MDS results from the imports dataset, similar analysis of the
remaining two projections are required. Next, the projection of the first and third dimensions are
considered.
In Figure 2, as in Figure 1, the relationship between the U.S. and Iran is distant. In this projection,
Uzbekistan (UZ) is the closest to Iran. This can be explained by both Iran’s and Uzbekistan’s close
trading ties to Russia noting Russia’s proximity to both Iran and Uzbekistan in the graph.[23] Notably,
other members and observers in the SCO next surround Iran. From the top right around to the bottom
right are: Tajikistan (TJ), Kazakhstan (KZ), Kyrgyzstan (KG), India (IN), China (CN), Pakistan (PK), and
Mongolia (MN). At about the same distance, as the SCO members and observers, and similar to Figure
1, are Belarus and United Arab Emirates. In this projection, Iran’s major trading partner South Korea
(KR), accounting for 6.3 percent of Iran’s total imports, also appears at about the same distance as the
SCO members and observers.[24]
For completeness, the final graph to analyze in terms of imports depicts the second and third dimensions.
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Figure 3, like Figure 1 and 2, again shows the significant distance between the United States and Iran;
however, unlike previous projections demonstrates ties to EU countries, particularly Italy (IT) and France
(FR) and to a lesser degree Spain (ES), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE) and the United Kingdom (GB).
Even the Netherlands (NL) is relatively close. Iranian ties to both Italy and Germany have already been
discussed. This projection can be explained by the interconnectedness of EU economies as would be
expected given the formal structure of the EU with respect to trade, finance and economics.
Overall, the analysis of the imports data suggests that the U.S. has very little unilateral capacity to
influence Iran economically. The United States has a higher potential of negatively influencing both U.S.
economic partners and competitors globally, if sanctions were successful, as the economies of such
countries are closer to that of Iran than that of the United States. These circumstances and their potential
suggest that such an action by the U.S. would have significant political consequences. Conversely,
nothing in the results for imports suggested a strong interconnection between the American and Iranian
economy which means that such economic actions aimed at Iran would be unlikely to have a significant
adverse economic impact on the U.S. MDS has demonstrated the greatest levers economically lie with
the SCO and EU. Iran has managed to put itself in a strong economic position by developing a
relationship with both the SCO and EU, as the SCO and EU are themselves natural competitors
economically. Before making any final conclusions; however, it is necessary to conduct similar analysis of
the exports dataset.
Iranian Exports
The data describing Iranian exports shall by examined in the same manner as Iranian imports using MDS.
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Figure 4 shows the first two dimensions of the export MDS results. In this figure, Asian and Eurasian
countries are closer to Iran than the U.S. with Kyrgyzstan and Taiwan (TW) closest to Iran. Taiwan is
drawn in as a consequence of its close ties with other Asian economies such as China, Hong Kong (HK),
Japan (JP), South Korea and Singapore (SG), all well inside the threat ring. China accounts for 15
percent, Japan 14.3 percent and South Korea 7.3 percent of Iran’s total exports, predominately consisting
of petroleum resources.[25] Kyrgyzstan, as before, is close to Iran as a result of the strong SCO
representation inside the threat ring.
Figure 5, representing the first and third dimension for exports, continue to demonstrate the same distant
relationship between the United States and Iran. The closest countries to Iran are the United Arab
Emirates (whose relationship has already been discussed in relation to the imports MDS results) and
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Ukraine. Ukrainian ties to Iran are not just via Russia as one might expect, but also Turkey (TR). Turkey
accounts for 7.4 percent of Iranian total exports and 7.9 percent of Ukrainian total exports.[26] Turkey is
the first non-EU NATO member to draw any attention in this study and notably lies well inside of the
economic threat ring.
Figure 6 for the first time shows a close relationship between the U.S. and Iranian economy. This is
exciting in terms of representing an opportunity to exert direct influence; however, as the threat ring
indicates there are very few buffer states inside the circle to protect the US economy from a backlash.
This finding is a result of strong U.S. and China ties. The United States accounts for 19.1 percent of
Chinese total exports and China accounts for 15 percent of total Iranian exports.[27] Ireland (IE) also
appears close to Iran in the MDS results. This again demonstrates shared economic ties with other
European countries trading with Iran, predominately Germany and France accounting for 7.4 percent and
5.8 percent of Ireland’s exports respectively.[28] The relationship between Iran, Germany and France
has already been discussed.
The significance of the American and Chinese economy to this system can be seen in the following graph
also generated using UCINET on this dataset.
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Figure 7 was generated using principle component analysis on the exports dataset. Here the UCINET
software is attempting to organize the graph into components that are statistically significant. Just as in
MDS, countries are grouped together on the basis of similar trade patterns. The U.S. and China (CN)
each are their own component indicating that they are economic superpowers in this system. In the upper
left of the graph and tied more so to the U.S. than China, major European economies of the United
Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy form a component. In the lower right of the graph and tied strongly
to both the U.S. and China, the major Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong
form a component. The remaining countries in the dataset do not appear to form distinct logical
components, but instead have a myriad of ties to the U.S. and China as well as the major economies of
both Europe and Asia.
Hypothesis Testing
Having completed the analysis of MDS results, it is now necessary to compare these results to the
political strategies of the key actors related to Iranian trade. To demonstrate that economics influence
international relations, countries who agree with US policy goals conceptually with respect to Iran and
have strong ties to Iran economically would need to engage in political strategies which do not result in a
negative economic impact upon themselves. If countries are willing to accept negative impacts on their
own economy to pursue policy goals, then that serves to disprove this hypothesis.
As MDS results indicate, the member states of the EU and SCO represent those countries with the
strongest economic ties to Iran. Therefore, the policy goals of these organizations and the specific
countries identified as most significant within them shall be compared to U.S. policy goals. For those
countries found to share U.S. policy goals, their political strategies will be examined in terms of their
support of economic coercion of Iran. This comparison shall demonstrate the strength of the hypothesis
in this study and serve as an indicator of the possible success of such economic coercion of Iran.
First, it is necessary to establish in broad terms the policy goals with respect to Iran that the United States
hopes to achieve through economic coercion. U.S. foreign policy has been hostile toward Iran since the
1979 revolution and certainly in response to holding U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran hostage shortly
thereafter. Prior to the revolution, the U.S. had good relations and engaged in trade with the Iranian
regime of the Shah, as arguably a U.S. proxy in the region. Such diplomatic and economic relations were
severed as a result of the Iranian revolution and would have been naturally with or without the imposition
of U.S. sanctions.
U.S. sanctions on Iran continue to this day. These sanctions are not imposed by the United Nations
Security Council or any other multilateral organization or agreement. These sanctions are a result of
Executive Orders of the President of the United States and Congressional legislation.[29] These
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sanctions relate to four main issues of concern: Iranian suspected pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction including nuclear weapons, sponsorship of transnational terrorism, supporting violent
opposition to the Middle East Peace Process, and Iran’s domestic human rights violations.[30] U.S.
sanctions allow for limited commercial relations including Iranian food and medical imports from the U.S.
and food and carpet exports to the U.S.[31]
It has already been noted that these U.S. sanctions have not received formal multilateral support. In the
context of this research, the member states of the European Union and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization have the greatest capacity to influence Iranian economics. By the hypothesis posed in this
study, these same countries should then be unlikely to support sanctions owing to the consequences on
their own self-interest.
Examining EU policy on U.S. sanctions is perhaps the most interesting to consider first because of the
strong historical, cultural, economic and diplomatic ties between the U.S. and the members of the EU. In
a press release upon the renewal of the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, the EU Commissioner for
External Relations released the following statement: “As a matter both of principle and policy, the
European Union has long opposed unilateral sanctions laws with extraterritorial effects. Such laws,
designed to impose U.S. requirements on economic operations of foreign countries, threaten the open
international trading system.”[32]
This same statement highlights EU policy making corporate compliance with these U.S. sanctions illegal
by any company in the EU.[33] This official statement by the EU notes that such actions by the U.S.
create expense for European countries and companies whether or not they comply with the sanctions
and even threatens action against the U.S. in the World Trade Organization should the US engage in any
secondary boycotts or sanctions of European countries or companies owing to their non-compliance with
U.S. sanctions.[34]
Such strong policy and rhetoric emanating from the closest allies of the United States might represent
strong disagreement with the issues the United States has with Iran; however, the very same EU
statement concurs that the EU is concerned with Iranian weapons of mass destruction programs,
sponsorship of terrorism and human rights violations.[35] Therefore, it seems reasonable to take this EU
policy at face value to mean that the EU opposes these sanctions owing only to the economic self-
interest of its member states.
Germany, France and Italy are not only some of the strongest economic powers within the EU, but they
are also those most strongly tied to Iran based on the results of this study. The alignment of EU policy to
economics over diplomatic ties to the U.S. supports the underlying hypothesis that economics constrains
international relations and that such tendency can by quantified by empirical measurement.
The member states of the SCO were next identified as those most capable of exerting influence over the
Iranian economy. SCO policy shows a similar dominance of economics in international relations as found
in the case of EU member countries. Setting the stage for this analysis, it is most easy to understand that
Iran has observer status in the SCO where the US lacks such status and key members of the SCO,
Russia and China, are historically global competitors with the US. Thus, unlike the members of the EU,
the members of the SCO except perhaps India do not have a long history of close friendly ties to the U.S.
Even India has previously grossly defied U.S. policy initiatives in terms of its own development of nuclear
weapons.
SCO focus areas are: multi-polar emergence to compete with U.S. global hegemony, energy sector
economic development, and regional security cooperation.[36] Central to the SCO strategy is what many
are metaphorically calling the New Great Game.[37] The New Great Game (NGG) represents
competition between the world’s greatest powers (US, Russia, China and India) for influence in Central
Asia and is predominately, but not entirely, tied to the exploitation of oil reserves. U.S. interest in these oil
reserves is two-fold. First, much of this oil has the potential to be exported to Western Europe, including
the United States’ closest allies in the EU and NATO. The U.S. has an interest in supporting the goals
and advancement of its allies. Second, as oil is a fungible commodity, increased global supply can be
expected to reduce prices for all oil  consumers from all suppliers. As the world largest oil consumer, the
U.S. has an interest in lowering the price of oil.
Within the SCO, Russia, Uzbekistan and Pakistan are the countries with the strongest economic ties to
Iran according to the results of this study. Iran is a pivot point in the NGG physically, economically, and
ideologically residing between the great powers of the East and West. While Iran’s westward looking
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policies appear to the West to be roguish and radical, Iran’s eastward looking behavior predominately
consists of the rational economic and trade relationships previously noted in this study.
Friction between Russia and Pakistan is growing as the NGG emerges because Russia has chosen to
support India’s full membership in the SCO in order to form a powerful bloc to compete with China.[38] In
exchange, Russia is expected to support India’s desire for the exclusion of Pakistan from full membership
in the SCO. This naturally forces Pakistan to seek to cooperate with China. Iran has long cooperated with
the ideologically sympathetic countries of Pakistan and Uzbekistan, as seen in the economic data used
here; therefore, Russia’s desire to consolidate power is likely to move Iran closer to China while perhaps
still maintaining its economic ties to Russia.
While the US and China are competitors in Central Asia and in the NGG paradigm, globally the American
economy is strongly tied to the Chinese economy as already discussed. Notably, the United States is also
heavily reliant on Pakistan as a logistical supply route for US and NATO military forces in Afghanistan
and combating terrorism inside the borders of Pakistan. These ties and the emergent behavior in the
context of NGG and related to the growth of the SCO again place Iran at center of this problem.
Whether Iran is a mere pawn in the New Great Game, a power broker between the East and West, or
simply a large importing and exporting economy relative to other lesser developed countries in the region;
it is clear that none of the member states of the SCO can afford to damage their diplomatic or economic
relations with Iran without considering the consequences for their own economy. Few members of the
SCO have any strong sympathetic reason to support U.S. sanctions on Iran. Therefore, it is not surprising
that economic and policy decisions of the SCO also support the hypothesis that international relations in
this context are constrained by economics.
While the case of the EU, SCO and leading member states of these organizations supports the
hypothesis of this research, a potential bias is that this situation is not by accident. Iran has had roughly
30 years, from 1979 to today, to craft a strategy to undermine US sanctions by exploiting the globalized
economy, Iran’s advantageous geographical location, and global reliance on natural resources available
in Iran. This and other biases previously mentioned constrain the case of Iran to a proof-of-concept
admitting that there are many factors other than economics which are potentially causal in the emergence
of these conditions. This case, however, serves to demonstrate that irrelevant of such potential factors, it
is possible to identify and quantify the existence of these conditions using the methodology defined and
tested in this study based solely upon empirical analysis of balance of trade data.
Herein lies the limits of such techniques, identification and analysis of empirical results only provide
increased understanding of the context of the problem. Without more detailed contextual analysis it is not
possible to determine the best course of action to achieve policy aims given this increased understanding
of the problem. To this end, discussion of the foundation of such sanctions and alternatives are
addressed in the following section.
Context of U.S.-Iran Sanctions
Previously in this paper, the U.S. issues of concern with the Iranian regime have been articulated and the
hostile environment surrounding U.S.-Iran relations following the 1979 revolution have been touched on.
However, none of this history explains why sanctions were chosen over other approaches to resolving
this conflict.
Meghan O’Sullivan of the Brookings Institute makes the case that the U.S. engaged in unilateral
sanctions owing predominately to domestic issues rather than the truly shared interests of the
international community with respect to Iran’s weapon programs, sponsorship of terrorism, and human
rights violations.[39] As previously noted the international community shares these concerns; however,
does not share the American zeal for sanctions.
O’Sullivan notes in part that there is distrust of U.S. intentions owing to legitimate Iranian claims of US
meddling in Iranian affairs historically and American pro-Israeli leanings in the context of the Middle East
Peace Process.[40] Further, Iran received no lenience from the U.S. after its neutral stance in the Gulf
War and support of the current war in Afghanistan toppling the Taliban regime.[41] In fact, O’Sullivan
goes further arguing that while U.S. sanctions have done little to modify Iranian behavior and have to
some degree alienated U.S. allies in the EU and elsewhere, if anything sanctions ensure a stalemate in
U.S.-Iranian relations.[42]
The maintenance of internationally unpopular and arguably ineffective unilateral U.S. sanctions is
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=55[10/5/2011 1:11:04 PM]
attributed to the lobbying efforts of the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC).[43] The
interests of AIPAC are by definition a convolution of those of the United States and Israel arguably to the
neglect of broader U.S. interests. The Brooking’s Institute estimates that between the years of 1995 and
2001, these sanctions have cost Iran $4.4 billion while simultaneously costing the US$1.9 billion.[44]
Whether or not one agrees with the argument posed by the Brooking’s Institute entirely or the ideological
aspirations of AIPAC, the fact that AIPAC remains a powerful lobby affecting U.S. decision making
related to Iran cannot be neglected in considering alternatives to sanctions.
Ken Pollack who served on the National Security Council and prior to that as an Iran analyst at the
Central Intelligence Agency in both the Clinton and Bush Administrations proposes such a set of
alternatives in his book, The Persian Puzzle.[45] Specifically, Pollack proposes the following alternative
policies: (1) unilateral concessions, (2) the grand bargain, and a (3) triple track approach.[46]
The unilateral concessions alterative argues for lifting US sanctions with the aim of encouraging peaceful,
democratic regime change in Iran leading to the election of moderate leaders less desirous of pursuing
nuclear weapons, sponsoring terrorism and violating human rights.[47] The grand bargain alternative
involves negotiating all of the issues of concern between Iran and the US simultaneously with the existing
Iranian regime in exchange for normalized, if not favorable, relations as the immediate result.[48] Pollack
for relatively obvious reasons does not favor either of these alternatives, but rather favors a hybrid
approach he calls the triple track approach.
The triple track approach keeps the option for the grand bargain on the table should sufficient progress
be made toward conflict resolution; applies carrots and sticks to progress in meeting agreed upon
milestones in terms of nuclear weapons, sponsorship of terrorism and human rights; and maintains the
option for the U.S. to fall back to a new containment policy targeting Iran.[49] The premise being that this
new containment policy, perhaps even multilateral sanctions, would receive international support unlike
current U.S. sanctions, if the US has shown good faith in attempting to resolve its conflicts with Iran.
It is too early to determine to what degree the Obama Administration’s approach to its renewed interest in
conflict resolution with Iran takes advantage of these insights; however, what is clear is that maintaining
the U.S. regime of sanctions is likely to continue to have the same relatively insignificant positive
influence on Iran. It is not clear that analysts, such as Pollack, have considered the influence of
economics on international relations in terms of gaining international support. Likewise, consideration
limited to such empirical research neglects the emotional component raised by O’Sullivan in the context
of AIPAC sympathy to the state of Israel affecting U.S. foreign policy. 
Conclusions
Using Iran as a case study, this paper has demonstrated the viability of the concept of economic threat
rings as developed here using MDS as a tool to quantify the degree to which the interconnectedness of
global trade constrains international relations. While such quantitative methods applied to balance of
trade data appear useful in gaining improved understanding of the underlying complexities of the global
economic system, there remains a clearly articulated need for additional qualitative and contextual
analysis as well. Analysis of empirical data does not provide answers as to causality nor does it provide
prescriptions for intervening courses of action.
In this paper, some of these sources of bias and context have been discussed such as domestic policy
and historical legacies; however, many other sources of bias likely exist in any given case study.
Qualitative analysis regarding the relationship between economics and international relations has been
discussed in the context of Iran. Alternative policy options have been presented. What is perhaps most
valuable is the gained understanding that the most viable policies are likely those that account for the
observed behavior both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Volumes have been written on the qualitative aspects of international relations over generations perhaps
starting with Plato’s Republic; however, less intellectual effort has been expended examining the
quantitative aspects presented in this paper. Therefore, the greatest contribution of this work rests in the
development and application of the economic threat ring methodology. While the analytic technique
applied (Multi-Dimensional Scaling) is not a new mathematical technique, the application to balance of
trade as a tool for gaining insight into the propensity and potential of nation state actors in the complex
global economic system is new. Most important to the proper application of this technique is selection of
the countries to include in sample datasets based on international relations, the selection of the indicator
variable as percentage versus raw monetary value, and understanding how to apply theoretical selection
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criteria to analytical issues such as dimensionality and thresholds on stress.
The utility of such techniques shall endure not simply owing to continued U.S. interest with Iran as in this
case study, but as a result of the enduring fact of economics as an instrument of national power affecting
international relations. As globalization increases the interconnectedness of national economies around
the world, transnational trade relationships shall offer both increased risk and opportunity in the pursuit of
national objectives. While this interconnectedness potentially enables international coalition building
based upon common economic interest, such interconnectedness potentially deters, moderates, and
constrains nations from actions, which would negatively affect their economy. The growing complexity of
this paradox will challenge decision makers in new ways requiring the application of new tools such as
those presented in this paper.
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